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CONTRACTS, CONTROL AND CHARTER SCHOOLS: 
THE SUCCESS OF CHARTER SCHOOLS DEPENDS ON 
STRONGER NONPROFIT BOARD ÜVERSIGHT TO 
PRESERVE lNDEPENDENCE AND PREVENT 
DOMINATION BY FOR-PROFIT MANAGEMENT 
COMPANIES 
Julia L. Davis· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. "Education Entrepreneurs" and Charter School Control 
A recent New York Times article profiled energy executive 
Dennis Bakke and his wife Eileen, who, after retiring from his 
business, decided to enter the world of commercial charter 
schools "to experiment wi.th applying business strategies and 
discipline to public schools." 1 The couple's company, Imagine 
Schools, is now the largest for-profit manager of charter schools 
in the country.2 The piece was less than glowing and revealed 
a number of government officials and disgruntled charter 
school board members who reported the company's attempts to 
dominate and control their communities' non-profit charter 
schools. 3 
Imagine is not the only commercial charter school manager, 
known in the education world as an education management 
organization ("EM0").4 Companies like Mosaica Education 
* Julia L. Davis, .J.D., is an Associate at Venable, LLI' in New York. She is a 
graduate of Brown University and the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. She wishes 
to thank her husband, a New York City teacher, for his thoughtful insights offered on 
this topic. 
1. Stephanie Strom, For Charter School Company, lssues of Spending and 
Control, N.Y. TIMES, April 21, 2010, atA 1. 
2. ld. 
:3. ld. 
4. NAT'L CHAitTER SCH. RESEARCH l'RO,JECT, CTR. ON REINVENTJNG Pun. EDUC., 
DANIEL ,J. EVANS SCH. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, UN!V. OF WASH., QUANTITY COUNTS: THE 
1 
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Inc., Edison Schools, Inc., Charter Schools USA, White Hat 
Management and Chancellor Beacon Academies (which merged 
with Imagine in 2004) now manage between nine and twelve 
percent of all charter schools in the U.S. 5 Imagine's recent bad 
press is emblematic of the problems with for-profit companies 
managing charter schools that are emerging across the 
country.6 As the Times notes, "[R]egulators ... have found 
that Imagine has elbowed the charter holders out of virtually 
all school decision making - hiring and firing staff members, 
controlling and profiting from school real estate, and rctaining 
fees under contracts, which often guarantee Imagine's 
management in perpetuity."7 Imagine's methods, which are 
not unlike those of other management companies discussed in 
detail in this paper, unapologetically flout traditional nonprofit 
law by co-opting independent non-profit charter school boards 
who are their clients and creating obvious conflicts of interest 
in the financial operations of the schools they manage. 
According to the former president of the National Charter 
Schools Alliance (which is now defunct), "'Imagine works to 
dominate the board of the charter holder, and then it does a 
deal with the board it dominates- and that cannot be an arm's 
length transaction."'R The District of Columbia Charter School 
Board, which grants and oversees charters in Washington, said 
that it had "concerns about who was running thc show" at an 
Imagine-managed school in the city, and remarked more 
broadly, "'it is very hard for schools that hire management 
companies to maintain their independence, and chartcr schools 
are supposed to be independent."'9 According to the sarne 
G!(OWTH OF CHAR'n;l( SCHOOL MANAGEMENT ÜIWANIZATIONS (J\ug. 2007), auailable at 
http://www .crpe.org/cs/crpe/download/csr iiles/pu b ncsrp_ quancoun t _aug07. pdf 
[hereinafter NA'I''L CHARTim SCH. lü:SEAI{CH I'I((J.JECTj. The author uses the terms 
"EMO" and "for-profit managemcnt company" intL:rchangcably in this papcr. 
5. Quantity Counts: The Growth of Charter Sclwol Management Urganizations. 
U.S. CHAI('['ER SCHOOLS. http://www.uscharterscbools.org/cs/r/view/uscs_rs/2:l11 (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2010) ("For-profit education managl,mlmt organizations (EMOs) and 
nonprofit chartcr manageml,nt organizations (CMOs) rupn,scnt a small but growing 
portion (approximatL,Jy [nine] perccnt) of chartcr schools nationally."): Frank R. 
Kemercr & Catherine Maloney, The I~egal Frameworh for l~ducational l'rivatization 
and Accountahility, 150 Enuc. L. HEI'. 589, 605 (2001) (twclvc pcrccnt of chartcr 
schools are opl'ratcd by private organizations). 
6. Greg Richmond, Who's in Charge at Charter Schools~ Six Criteria for 
gnsuring the Quality of Gouerning Boards, EllUC. WK., .July 12, 201 O. 
7. Strom, supra note 2. 
8. ld. 
9. Jd. 
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education official, the "entire model of using management 
companies is flawed." 10 Indeed, the New York State legislature 
recently prohibited charter schools from hiring for-profit 
companies to manage schools. 11 
ln Texas, parents who were attempting to create a charter 
school with Imagine found that the company "'thought the 
charter belonged to them."' 12 ln a damning email sent by 
Imagine's founder to senior staff, Mr. Bakke reminded bis 
executives that the management company is "responsible for 
making big decisions about budget matters, school policies, 
hiring of the principal and dozens of other matters." 13 "It is our 
school, our money and our risk, not theirs." 14 Press reports like 
these have damaged the credibility of the charter school 
movement, and raised questions about the appropriate role of 
EMOs and the proper oversight of government officials and 
legislators. Some commentators have called for a prohibition on 
for-profit EMOs managing charter schools altogether because 
of "inherent" conflicts between the goals of public education 
and for-profit business. 15 
A new funding initiative called Race to the Top, created by 
the Obama administration, raises the stakes for charter schools 
by tying vast amounts of federal education grants to states' 
lifting caps on the number of charter schools they permit. 16 ln 
the face of financial crisis, many states are scrambling to dose 
state education budget shortfalls. Some are closing schools, 
laying off teachers, and searching for other sources of 
revenue. 17 ln this context, states have significant incentives to 
relax the barriers to charter schools in arder to obtain millions 
in federal aid. ln New York, for example, the legislature 
significantly increased the cap on charter schools from 200 to 
lO. ld. 
11. New York State Senate Bill i\11810. 
12. Strom, supra note 2 (quoting Karelei Munn). 
1 :l. i\ssociated l'ress. Chartcr School Operator Accused, THE ,JOURNAL GAZETTE, 
Oct. 25, 2009, auailable at http://www.journalgazette.net/articlc/200911 02/ 
LOCAL 10/911 029966/1216/LOCi\L 1006. 
11. ld. 
15. Kathlecn Conn, F'or-Profit School Manaf{ement Corporations: Seruing the 
Wronf? Master, :ll .J.L. & EDUC. 129, 117 (2002). 
16. LJ.S. ]);:PARTMENT OF EDUCATION, RACE TO THE TOP EXECUTlVE SUMMARY 11 
(2009), auailablc at http://www2.ed.gov/programs/raeetothetop/executive-summary.pdf 
1 7. See, e.f{., l{honda Holman, Editorial, Statc's Shortfall Stretchinf{ Schools, THE 
W!CHITA EA<:LE, Dce. 1:l, 2009, auailable at http://www.kansas.com/2009/ 
12/1 :l/1 09621 0/states-shortfall-stretching-schools.html. 
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460 state-wide following its failure to win $700 million in Race 
to the Top funds during the first round of the competitive 
application process in arder to make thc state eligible to 
reapply. 18 
This is a criticai time for charter schools as they are 
increasingly held by politicians and the public as a solution for 
failing public schools. 19 ln addition to federal support, charter 
schools have attracted the interest of private philanthropists 
and foundations. 20 Even the once hostil e teachers' unions are 
finding a role to play in charter school educa tion. 21 Wha t was 
an experiment of the early 1990s is now increasingly part of 
the fabric of public education throughout the United States. 
Scrutiny has followed. 
While most research has focused on determining whether 
charter schools produce better academic achievement for 
students, anecdotal information from the press, the courts, and 
the Internal Revenue Service reveals an emerging problematic 
by-product of the movement's reliance on private organizations 
and competition-namely improper domination of nonprofit 
charter school boards by for-profit management companies.22 
Scholarly critique has focused on some of the constraints placed 
on EMOs to ensure they put pupils before profits, but little has 
been written about the risks that face nonprofit schools that 
contract with EMOs or the appropriate role charter school 
boards should play to ensure schools serve students and the 
community with public dollars. 
For charter schools to meet the requirements of 
accountability and financial stewardship that their use of 
public funds requires, the relationships betwcen nonprofit 
charter school boards and management companies must 
radically change. State and federal reforms are necessary to 
promote school independence, bolster credibility in the charter 
school movement generally, and prevent charter school 
18. Jennifer Medina, Statc Senate Approucs !Jill to /ncrease Charter Schuols, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 4. 2010, at A28. 
19. Amanda Ripley, Waiting for "Superman": A Call to Action for Our Schouls, 
TIM"; MAGAZINE, September 2:3, 2010. at 1. 
20. Nancy Hass, Scholarly Jnuestments, N.Y. TIMES, Dl•:c. 6, 2009, Nl' S'l'1. 
21. Sam Dillon, As More Charter Schools Unionize, Educators /Jebate lhe l~ffect, 
N.Y. TIMES, ,July 27,2009, atAl. 
22. Sec, e.g., Richmond, supra note 7. 
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domination by EMOs in jurisdictions where they are permitted 
to operate. 
This paper seeks to: (1) describe and analyze how the IRS, 
two states' legislatures, and courts have recently attempted to 
limit the control of management companies over nonprofit 
charter schools; (2) demonstrate the limitations and 
weaknesses of the current state of the law and, (3) recommend 
areas for rulemaking at the state and federal levei to help 
nonprofit charter-holding organizations attain effective 
oversight of for-profit management companies and to protect 
them from the threat of tax exemption revocation and 
intermediate sanctions for excess benefit transactions. 
B. A Brief History of the Charter School Mouement 
The charter school movement in the United States is nearly 
twenty years old23 and its history reflects a generation of 
struggle among a broad range of stakeholders to improve the 
education available to the country's youth. 24 Today, there are 
over 4,000 charter schools (also known in some states as 
"community schools") serving more than 1.2 million school-aged 
children in 40 states.25 Roughly three percent of school-aged 
children attend a charter school. 26 
Charter schools are public schools that enjoy freedom from 
some of the state regulation that traditional public schools 
must follow; 27 however, as creatures of state legislation, 
charter schools must nonetheless follow state guidelines.28 
Generally, state law requires an organization seeking to start a 
school to make an application for a charter from a state or local 
education authority (e.g., a school board or a state regent) in 
2il. History, USCHARTEitSCHOOI,S.ORC:, http://www.uscharterschools.org/puh/ 
uscs_docs/o/history.htm (iast visitcd Oct. 20, 2010). 
21. See, e.g., .James Forman, ,Jr., Do Charter Schools Threaten l'ublic l~ducation? 
f;~merging f;~uidence From Fifteen Years of a Quasi-Marhet for Schooling, 2007 U. ]LL. L. 
REV. 8:19 (2007). 
25. USCS State Profiles, US CHARTim SCHOOLS, http://www.uscharterschools.org/ 
cs/sp/query/q/1595 (last visited Oct. 20, 2010). Sincc 1991, when Minnesota passed the 
first chartcr schoollegislation, 10 states, thc District of Columbia and l'uerto Hico have 
sigm'd into law chartcr school legislation (AK, AH, AZ, CA, CO, CT, DC, DE, FL, GA, 
Hl, ID, IL, lN, IA, KS, LA, MA, MD, MI, MN, MO, MS, NC, NH, N.J, NM, NV, NY, OH, 
OK, OR, I'A, !'!{, ]{], SC, TN, TX, UT, V A, Wl, WY). States in which a charter school 
law has not heen passed include: AL, KY, ME, MT, NO, NE, SD, VT, WA, and WV. ld. 
26. NNr'L CHAWI'Eit SCH. i{ESEARCH J'I(().JECT, supra note 5, at il. 
27. History, supra note 21. 
28. ld. 
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order to receive public education funding. 29 The charter, if 
granted, is a kind of contract that outlines the obligations of 
the school and the expectations of the granting governmental 
body.30 The charter may include a mutually-accepted mission 
for the school, details regarding the scope of the curriculum 
and any special area of focus, the students to be recruited (and 
whether the school may restrict access in any way through an 
application or residence requirement, or whether it is "open 
enrollment"), and indicators for determining whether the 
school is meeting its academic goals. 31 Because charter schools 
are encouraged by state governments as a "laboratory" for 
education innovation, the charter is typically granted for a few 
years before it becomes ripe for renewal by the sponsor, 
permitting schools some time to develop before formal 
evaluation to determine whether they should continue.32 
According to proponents, "charter schools ... exercise increased 
autonomy in return for ... [academic and fiscal] accountability" 
to "the sponsor that grants them [a charterj, the parents who 
choose them, and the public that funds them."33 
The ideas behind charter schools can be traced to education 
reform efforts beginning in the 1970s,34 as well as broader 
trends to privatize government services more generally. 35 ln 
1991, Minnesota passed the first charter schoollaw, followed a 
year later by California. 36 Charter schools have been a darling 
of both democrat and republican leadership, and among federal 
and state officials. 37 Charter schools appeal to ideological views 
on the right (school "choice," market forces, competition, 
efficiency in government through out-sourcing) and the left 
(curriculum reform, community control and access to quality 
public education, especially for low-income and minority 
29. ld. 
30. Id. 
i11. fd. 
il2. Id. 
ilil. ld. 
il4. Jd. 
i35. For a discussion of the history hehind early arguments for privatization of 
puhlic education based on theories of government monopoly and the power of markds, 
see Lewis D. Solomon, Edison Schools and the l'rivatization o( K- 12 l'u.blic l~du.cation: 
A Le{{al and Policy Analysis, ilO FOH.IlHAI\1 UIW. L .• J. 1281, l:l:J!l (200:1). 
:16. History, supra note 21. 
:l7. fd. 
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students).3K This, however, does not mean that the movement 
has been without vocal detractors. 39 Nonetheless, the federal 
government has provided incentives for charter school creation 
under No Child Left Behind, which provides grants for failing 
public schools to reorganize as charter schools.40 Other federal 
funds are also available to charter schools, including new 
initiatives ofthe Obama administration. 41 Venture capital and 
private philanthropy is also a significant supporter of charter 
schools, bringing hundreds of millions of dollars into a 
landscape that has attracted management companies.42 
C. Management Companies in Charter School Education 
Organizations and individuais seeking to create a charter 
school are usually grassroots nonprofits and parents, teachers 
and community leaders, entrepreneurs, or existing public or 
private schools converting to charter status.43 The majority of 
charter schools in the U.S. are nonprofit organizations;44 
however, in a handful of states for-profit schools may receive a 
charter to contract directly with the state or local government 
to provide public education.45 Even in states where for-profit 
:l8. Scc, e.g, Bipartisan Support for Charter Schools, CTR. FOI( EDU. REFORM, 
(May 6, 2008), http://www.edreform.com/published_pdf!Bipartisan_Support_ 
for_Charter_Schools.pdf 
39. Teachcrs' unions have bccn among thc strongcst opponcnts of charter schools. 
See gcnerally AMERICi\N FEDEI(i\TION OF TEi\CHERS, CHi\RTER SCHOOL LAWS: IJO THEY 
MEASUI(E UI'? (1996); see also William Haft, Charter Schools and the Nineteenth 
Century Corporation: A Match Made in the Public Interest, :lO ARIZ. ST. L.,J. 1023 
(1998), for a discussion of some of thc movemcnt's critics. 
10. 20 U.S.C.A §§ 7221, 722:l, 6:l16(b)(8)(A)-(B)(i)(2010). 
11. l'rcss ]{c I case, U .S. Dcpartmcnt of Education, l'residcnt Obama, U .S. 
Sccrctary of I•;ducation Duncan Announcc National Compctition to Advancc School 
Rcform: Competition to Advancc School Reform Ohama Administration Starts $1.35 
Billion "l{ace to thc Top" Compdition, Plcdgcs a Total of $10 Billion for ({eforms (July 
21, 2009), http://www.ed.gov/ncws/prcssrclcases/2009/07/07242009.html. 
12. PHILi\NTHHOI'Y RoUNilTi\BLE, http://www.philanthropyroundtahlc.org/content. 
asp?contcntid=55íl (last visitc>d Oct. 20, 201 O) (a rccent meeting of leading 
philanthropists working on charter cducation includcd intcrnational, domestic and 
regional grant-makcrs); Scott Olstcr, For!{et Superman, Charter Schools are Waiting 
for Oprah. FORTUNE, Scpt. ;)(), 201 O, available at http:/imoncy.cnn.com/2010/09/.10/ 
ncws/cconomy/waiting_for_sllperman.fortunelindcx.htm. 
1:1. History, supra note 21. 
11. See Charter Schools: Findin!{ out the facts: At a Glancc, CENTER FOR PUBLIC 
EDUCATION, http://www.centcrforpuhliceducation.org/Main-Mcnu/Organizing-a-school! 
Charter-schools-Finding-out-thc-faets-At-a-glancc/default.aspx (last visitcd Oct 22. 
2010) (thirty perccnt of ali chartcr schools are run hy EM Os and sixtcen pl>rcent of ali 
chartcr schools are run by for-profit EMOs). 
15. See, e.!{., id .. at figun' I. 
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companies are prohibited from holding charters, for-profit 
compames may contract with nonprofit charter-holding 
organizations to manage facilities, oversee day-to-day 
operations, hire and fire teachers and execute the curriculum 
in charter schools.46 Charter schools hire EMOs because the 
parties creating a new school often possess no or insufficient 
experience in managing schools.47 Management companies 
offer this expertise and help newly formed schools save time 
and resources by adopting curricula that have been previously 
developed by the EMO, and by benefitting from pooled 
purchasing power for essential supplies, as the company 
negotiates preferred or discounted prices on beha]f of the 
charter through economies of scale.4x 
II. THE PROBLEM: lNCOMPLETE LEGAL GUIDANCE TO ENSURE 
APPROPRIATE AND ACCOUNTABLE ROLES FOR NONPHOFIT 
CHARTER SCHOOLS WHO CONTRACT WITH MANAGEMENT 
COMPANIES 
From a legal perspective, charter schools occupy a shadowy 
terrain between purely "pub]ic" and "private" education, forcing 
state legislatures and the courts to develop rules to ensure the 
accountability that the public expects of public education, while 
permittmg and encouraging the dynamism and 
experimentation available in autonomous private schools.49 
Over the last two decades, charter schools have become further 
complicated by not only crossing public and private boundaries, 
but merging nonprofit and for-profit organiz:ational forms m 
the provision of education.50 
As previously mentioned, most states have made it 
impossible for for-profits to hold a charter directly, but 
loopholes remain to permit contracting with for-profits to 
manage the day-to-day operations of charter schools. 51 Fears 
16. John Morley, For-l'rofit and Nonprofit Char'er Schools: An Agency Costs 
Approach, 115 YALE L .• J. 1782, 1785-86 (2006); scc also Conn. su.pm noLl' 16, a L 129-:30. 
17. David Walk, How Edumtional Management Compcznics Serve Chartcr 8chools 
and Their Studcnts. :32 J .L. & Edu c. 211, 252 (200:l). 
18. Jd. 
49. Julie F. Mead, fJeuilish fJetails: lúploring Fcatures o/ Chart.cr 8chool Statutes 
that 13lur the l'ublic/ l'riuatc fJistinction, 10 HAilV .• J. ON U:c:Js. :l19 (200:l). 
50. Morley, supra note 17, at 1788. 
51. ld. at 1789-91. 
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that for-profit organizations would put profits before education 
likely motivated these state legislatures to avoid conferring 
charters on for-profit companies directly. The role of for-profit 
companies in charter school education has been a touchstone 
for many concerns of parents, teachers and other stakeholders 
that charter school laws will create a publically-funded for-
profit education industry. 52 ln a 2007 report from The Center 
on Reinventing Public Education at the University of 
Washington, the authors described the "lessons learned" over 
more than a decade of charter school business based on 
interviews with the leaders of management companies.53 Far 
from reassuring, the research makes no effort to capture the 
experience of nonprofit charter school boards (EMO clients) or 
local school officials, and reveals an industry that self-reports 
finding profits and growth challenging, due, in part, to the 
resistance of legislatures, boards and local community 
members to permit EMOs to use their packaged curricula and 
policies or "scale up" by operating multiple schools.54 ln 
language that this author suspects would raise the hackles of 
many charter-granting authorities, legislatures and education 
community members, EMOs are encouraged to be more 
disciplined about "client acquisition" to reduce the "costs" 
associated with shared decision-making, or tailoring pre-
existing curricula or operations protocols. 55 
The obvious strategy of for-profit management companies is 
to centralize decision-making, m1mmize nonprofit board 
member and community involvement, control the charter 
application process, resist requests to alter curricula and 
education "models," and simultaneously capitalize on 
opportunities for expansion to increase scale and market share 
in the geographic region. 56 The result is a charter school that 
is incontrovertibly controlled by the management company, 
instead of the nonprofit board that received the government-
issued charter for the school. 
A recent ninth circuit court of appeals decision interpreting 
federal statutc ruled that for-profit charter schools may not 
receiVe Elementary and Secondary Education Act or 
52. Id.; see also Conn, supra note 16, at 1:31. 
5:l. NA'I''L CHAR'I'EI{ SCH. lü;::mAIWH PRO.JEC'I', supra note 5, at 7. 
51. Id. at 1-5. 
55. ld at 2:l-26. 
56. Id. 
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Individuais with Disabilities Education Act funds. 57 As 
enormous revenue sources for charter schools, this ruling puts 
further pressure on nonprofit boards. EMOs who could operate 
their own for-profit schools in some states, following this 
ruling, must work for a non-profit charter school board if they 
wish to receive any of these federal funds. As for-profit 
companies realize that nonprofit charter schools are their 
"meal ticket" for funding from Washington, they will have more 
incentive to dominate and control the charter school boards 
they ostensibly serve.5g 
Courts have been called upon to define and confine the 
relationships between nonprofit organizations and 
management companies, policing the interaction to ensure that 
nonprofits continue to provide oversight and leadership in the 
provision of education where for-profit companies are not 
permitted to hold charters. 59 It would appear, however, that 
potential conflicts of i.nterest, weak oversight, and improper 
management company control in the charter school arena go 
un-litigated, arguably because of challenges facing plaintiffs to 
bring suits (lack of standing and limited causes of action60) and 
lack of institutional resources for monitoring or enforcement 
(by state and local government, charter-conferring 
organizations, or attorneys general). A few state legislatures 
have amended their original charter school legislation to 
respond to the evolving role of for-profit companies working 
with charter schools, including defining the roles of boards and 
establishing safeguards for nonprofi.t independence.61 
At the federal levei, the relationships between for-profit 
management companies and nonprofit charter schools threaten 
a nonprofit's tax exempt status. Language from the Internal 
57. Ariz. State Bd. for Chartcr Schs. v. U.S. Dcp't of Educ., 161 F.:ld 100:1 (9th 
Cir. 2006). 
58. Mark D. Evans, An J<;nd to Federal Funding of For-Profit Charter Schools(, 79 
U. CoLO. L. HEV. 617, 645-16(2008). 
59. See, e.g., Carhondalc An~a Sch. Dist. v. Fell Chartcr Sch., 829 A.2d 100 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 200:l); W. Chcster Arca Sch. Dist. v. Collcgium Charler Sch., 812 A.2d 
1172 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002); Brackbill v. Ron Brown Chartcr Sch., 777 A.2d I :31 (l'a. 
Commw. Ct. 2001); Sch. District of York v. Lincoln-Edison Chartcr Sch., 772 A.2d 1015 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001). 
60. Conn, supra note Hi, at 1 :n (discussing thc legal barricrs to brinhring claims 
against managcment companies undcr uxisting corporatl~ law and statc-crcatud "other 
constitucncy" statutes). 
61. OHIO i{EV. COill•; ANN. ~ :l:lH.O:l; see Altcrnatiws Unlimited-Spccial, lnc. v. 
Ohio Dept. of Educ .. 8Gl N.K2d IG:l (Ohio CL. App. 200()). 
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Revenue Service Manual for agency reviewers and a handful of 
IRS rulings provide insufficient guidance to nonprofits who 
seek to contract with for-profit management companies.62 
My analysis concludes that ex post gap-filling by the courts 
and ad hoc amendments by state legislatures are incomplete 
remedies to ensure that for-profit companies do not exploit 
superior resources and bargaining power to impermissibly 
control charter schools where they are not permitted to operate 
schools for profit. Clear ex ante rules are essential from the 
state legislature to help: (1) charter-granting organizations to 
detect when an application made by a nonprofit is merely an 
opportunity for an EMO's alter ego; (2) nonprofit boards to 
establish themselves with credibility, guide their board activity 
and oversight, and prevent conflicts of interest; and, (3) 
nonprofit boards structure the contracts they make with 
management companies to prevent excessive delegation. After 
nearly two decades of charter schools, it is clear that the courts' 
decisionallaw and state legislatures' efforts on these issues are 
insufficient. 
The threats that agreements with for-profit management 
companies pose to nonprofit charter schools' tax-exempt status 
are under-deterred and infrequently addressed by Lhe IRS and 
Department of Treasury. These government bodies should 
develop clearer guidelines for nonprofits to follow in their 
relationships with EMOs to provide charter school education, 
so as to help avoid potential revocation and taxation for excess 
benefit transactions among board members and other 
interested parties. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. State Legislative and Judicial Gap-Filling 
States that permit charter schools can be divided into two 
legal regimes: "restrictive" and "permissive." Under the latter, 
state statutes are either silent as to whether charter schools 
must operate as nonprofits, or they explicitly permit for-profit 
62. See IRM 1\.76.8.8 (.July 1, 200:l), auailablc at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/ 
irm_0!\-076-008.html#dCk619. Sec also, 2001 ms NSAR 20010799R, 2001 WL 
:Wl18860 (Aug. :n, 2001); 2001 INS NSAR 20010822R, 2001 WL 3<1818873 (Oct. 25, 
2001); 2000 ms NSAR 2000075:ll{, 2000 WL :H5!\8:l59 (Oct. :30, 2000); 1997 IRS NSAR 
o:l91, 1997 WL a:ls1 0217. 
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charter schools. 63 This means that a for-profit company could 
receive a charter and operate a publicly funded school for 
profit. Arizona is an example of a state with "permissive" 
charter schoollaws.64 
This paper addresses "restrictive" states, which require that 
a charter school operate as a nonprofit. Ohio and Pennsylvania 
are examples of "restrictive" states, where for-profit 
management companies have flourished and there has been 
comparatively significant litigation and legislative action 
concerning their role. Although, the issues of conflict of 
interest, board oversight, delegation, control and enforcement 
that emerge in "restrictive" regimes overlap in many ways, the 
discussion that follows attempts to break out three general 
areas where state legislatures and courts have grappled with 
tensions emerging from EMO agreements: (1) Conflict of 
Interest and Board Oversight; (2) Nonprofit Board Duties and 
Delegation; and (3) Standing, Enforcement and Attorneys 
General. 
1. Conflict of interest and board oversight 
Because nonprofit organizations are intended to provide 
oversight of the school's operations and lead its governance in 
"restrictive" states, some legislatures havc amended their laws 
to clarify nonprofit board members' roles and to rcduce 
opportunities for conflicts of interest. Conflicts emerge where 
there is overlap in representation on the board of the nonprofit 
and members of the EMO, or where there may be improperly 
close relationships between the two. Such ties threaten the 
accountability of charter schools by creating opportunities for 
self-dealing. While there are very few reportcd cases that 
address board oversight or self-dealing among charter school 
board members and management companies, Ohio offers an 
example. 
ln Board of Trustees Sabis International School v. 
Montgomery, the existing charter school board of directors 
brought an action, based on due process and equal protection 
theories, as well as state law contract and fraud claims, against 
the state charter-granting body, the school supcrintendant, the 
6;i. Mead, supra note 50, at :362. 
64. See Amz. HEV. STAT. ANN. ~ 15-1 il1 (A) (:WJO). 
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attorney general, and the former board chair. 65 The claims 
were based on the alleged failure of the state defendants "to 
take certain action to protect" the nonprofit charter school from 
the "harmful" agreement with the management company 
entered into by the former board members. 66 The existing 
nonprofit board had sought help from the state in mediating a 
contract dispute between the school and the EMO under an 
arbitration clause in the school's charter agreement with the 
government. 67 
Conflict of interest on the nonprofit board had brought 
about the problems between the school and the management 
company. The former board chairwoman, who had led the 
decision to hire the company, had multiple family ties to the 
company's leadership. (Her uncle founded the company and 
another relative was the current president.) As the board 
chair, she had been the sole board member to negotiate and 
sign all agreements with the management company, including 
a promissory note and a lease agreement, pursuant to which, 
the nonprofit paid the management company approximately 
$98,000 per month for use of the school building.68 When 
additional board members joined, the chairwoman was ousted 
and the remaining board members terminated the contract 
with the management company following the end of the current 
school year. 
The management company claimed there were legitimate 
"disagreements over how to draw the line between the 
[nonprofit board'sj involvement with the school" and its own.69 
The company complained of the [board's] "micro-management 
of the school."70 
This case is an example of the need for clear rules to guide 
nonprofit charter school boards with regard to both self-dealing 
and oversight of management companies running the day-to-
day school operations. ln addition to the obvious conflict in 
hiring the company, the contract in Sabis provided for the 
6fi. Bel. of Trs. Sabis lnt'l Sch. v. Montgomery, 205 F. Supp. 2d 8~15 (S.D. Ohio 
2002). 
66. ld. at í\12. 
67. ld. at í\10. 
68. Jd. 
G9. Jd. at 810-11. 
70. ld. 
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EMO to retain control of all of the school's financial recordso 71 
This made subsequent efforts by the non-interested board 
members to exert oversight over the company difficulto 72 
The court in Sabis ultimately dismissed all claims against 
the defendants and stated that the Ohio superintendant of 
education had no obligation under the charter school statute to 
"monitor or report on a school's service provider lmanagement 
company]o"73 ln a clear effort to hold the board squarely 
responsible for the failures of the school, the court wagged its 
finger at the plaintiffs, admonishing them that: "neither [the 
superintendant] nor anyone from her office encouraged the 
[b]oard to enter into the o o o [a]greement in the first placeo The 
[b]oard made that decision independently, as it is permitted to 
do under Ohio law, and it cannot now fault the Stateo"74 The 
result of the suit was that the charter school board had no 
remedy against anyone (including its self-dealing former board 
chair), and it had no more guidance than before the suit as to 
how to exert the kind of oversight and control the legislature 
and the court required of ito 
Soon after this case, the Ohio state legislature passed a 
conflict of interest amendment to its charter school 
legislationo75 Under the revised statutory scheme, nonprofit 
charter school boards must include "not less than five 
individuais who are not owners or employees, or immediate 
relatives of owners or employees, of any for-profit firm that 
operates or manages a school."76 A more recently revised 
version of the law goes even further to root-out conflict of 
interest, stating," [N]o present or former member, or 
immediate relative of a present or former member, of the 
[nonprofit charter school board] shal1 be an owner, employee, or 
consultant of any nonprofit or for-profit operator of a 
community school, unless at least one year has elapsed since 
the conclusion of the person's membershipo"77 
Nothing in the statute, however, outlines the terms that 
boards should negotiate in contracts with management 
71. fd. 
72. ld. at 811. 
7il. ld. at 851-52 (interpreting OHIO I{!.: v. COLJE ÀNN. § :l:ll1.12). 
71. ld. at 852. 
75. ld. (referencing the fornwr lnnguagP of OHIO lü:v. Com: Àê\IN § :l:l11.02(E)). 
76. ld. 
77. OHIO Iü:v. COim i\NN. § :J:n 1.02(E)(:l) (2009). 
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compames, or defines the respective roles of boards and 
compames to prevent "micro-managing" or inappropriate 
delegation. Should the state permit the contract to include any 
terms to which the parties agree where savvy management 
companies, who have explicit strategies to limit client 
involvement, are negotiating with nonprofit charter school 
boards, who may be made up of community members, parents 
and teachers? This assumes an equity in bargaining power 
that does not exist. Arguably, apart from the conflict of 
interest issue in board membership, the charter school in Sabis 
should not have become the recipient of a promissory note from 
the management company, nor become its lessee. These 
ancillary relationships reduced the ability of the board to 
negotiate with the company from a position of strength solely 
as a client or customer, and provided disincentives to 
challenging any of the company's decisions or practices. 
Nonetheless, EMOs routinely obtain and contrai school 
facilities, using "debt and real estate to bind schools to it."n 
Statutes that more explicitly detail the scope of the 
relationship between nonprofit boards and EMOs and perhaps 
provide model contract language, would have guided the board 
to exert more effective control in Sabis. Alternatively, 
removing real estate from the relationship altogether may be 
more effective. Cities like Washington, D.C. and New York 
work with charter schools to obtain buildings, which means 
that management companies do not control this significant 
asset. 79 
2. Charter school nonprofit board duties and delegation 
Pennsylvania has the most charter school litigation of any 
state. ~o These cases explore the appropriate level of control a 
charter school board should exert over a management 
company, and at what point the nonprofit has become nothing 
more than a shell for the for-profit. ln Carbondale Area School 
District v. Fell Charter School, a community of residents 
created a nonprofit organization and applied for a charter so 
they could keep a school in their neighborhood after the state 
authority had closed the local public school and consolidated 
7H. Strom, supra notP 2. 
79. ld. 
HO. Ml'ad. supra note 50. 
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the district. 81 ln its application, the community stated that it 
planned to contract with the for-profit management company 
Mosaica Education Inc. 82 to oversee the day-to-day operation of 
the charter school. The state authority denied the application 
because, inter alia, it found that the community nonprofit 
board would be "nothing more than a rubber stamping body" 
for Mosaica. 83 Specifically, the state authority suggested that 
the nonprofit board had delegated an impermissible number of 
responsibilities to Mosaica, including: 
(1) preparation of the annual budget, (2) maintenance and 
retention of all financial and student records, (3) 
recommendation and enforcement of rules, regulations, and 
procedures. . . (4) solicitation and receipt of grants and 
donations ... (5) selection, evaluation, assignment, discipline, 
supervision, and transferring of [the school's] personnel, (6) 
determination of [the school's] staffing levcl, (7) selcction and 
employment of the [school's] principal, and (8) providing [thc 
school] with Mosaica's copyrighted Paragon curriculum. 84 
The community nonprofit appealed to the state charter 
school appeal board, which reversed the lower state authority's 
decision and directed it to grant the charter. 85 The state 
authority refused and petitioned the state court for review. 86 
The court looked to the Pennsylvania charter school statute~0 
using the analysis it developed in West Chester Area School 
District v. Collegium Charter School, which involved another 
charter school managed by Mosaica.88 The court stated: 
Clearly . . . the legislature did not want to entrust the 
management and operation of the charter school itself to 
entities seeking to make money from the schools management 
and operation; rathcr, that powcr is granted to the charter 
81. Carhondale Area Sch. Dist. v. Fell Charter Sch., 82!1 A.2d -100, -102 (l'a. 
Commw. Ct. 200:l). 
82. Mosaica Education is a for-profít charter school "opcrator" whose current 
executive managemcmt is made up of private equity anel management consultant 
alumni. MOSAICA EllUCA'I'lclN, http://mosaicaeducation.com/ahout-mosaica/. 
8:3. Carbondale Arca Sch. /Jist., 152!1 A.2d at -106. 
8-1. Id. 
85. Jd. at 402. 
156. Jd. at 402-0:3. 
87. l'A. CONS. STAT. ANN § 17-1719-i\(;j) (Wcst 2009). 
88. W. Chester Arca Sch. Dist. v. Colkgium Charter Sch., 760 A.2d -1G2 (l'a. 
Commw. Ct. 2000). 
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school's board of trustees who ... have a single purpose to 
promote the interests of pupils. 89 
The issue, according to the court, is whether the charter 
school's board will have a "real and substantial authority and 
responsibility for the educational decisions, and the teachers 
are employees of the charter school itself.90 
Ultimately, the court affirmed the appeals board, holding 
that the delegation of administration outlined in the Mosaica 
agreement was permissible, and that the charter would not 
prevent the nonprofit board from "exercising ultimate control of 
the charter school."91 The Carbondale court's holding mirrors 
that of several other Pennsylvania cases challenging the 
delegation of charter school control to for-profit management 
companies.92 ln all of these cases, the suspicions of local school 
districts that refused to grant charters to nonprofits working 
with management companies were dismissed by administrative 
boards of appeals and the courts. 
These cases are illustrative of the dissonance between the 
legislature's expectations and the realities of many charter 
schools. While nonprofit boards are intended to promote 
accountability and play an active role in ensuring profit 
motives do not undermine educational goals, Carbondale, and 
the other Pennsylvania cases, stand for the proposition that 
boards may relinquish a school's actual fiscal, personnel, and 
even curricular decision-making to a for-profit company, as 
long as the contract states that the nonprofit board maintains 
"ultimate control."93 These decisions are especially revealing 
considering that the Pennsylvania charter schoollaw is robust, 
and includes specific language about the required sphere of 
89. Carbondale Area Sch. Dist., 829 A.2d at 102. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Sch. Dist. of York v. Lincoln-Edison Charter Sch., 798 A.2d 295 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 2002) (affirming appeals board revcrsal of school district and dinding the grant of 
a charter to a nonprofit contracting with the Edison School lnc. management 
company); Brackbill v. Hon Brown C h arte r Sch., 777 A.2d 181 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001) 
(affirming appcals board revcrsal of school district and directing the grant of a charter 
to a nonproflt contracting with Mosaica); W Chester Area Sch. Dist., 760 A.2d 452 (l'a. 
Commw. Ct. 2000) (affirming appcals board rcvcrsal of school district that conduded 
nonprofit was not an independcnt, pubJic, non-profit corporation, but in fi1ct, a profit-
making condnit for the managcment company Mosaica, and directing the grant of the 
chartcr). 
9:3. Carbondale Area S'ch. J)ist., 829 A.2d at 107; see also !3rachbill, 777 A.2d at 
1:37. 
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nonprofit charter school board responsibilities. 94 Nonctheless, 
the courts refuse to move beyond the scope of the contract 
language to determine and ensure that actual board activities 
will not, in fact, act as a "rubber stamp" for the management 
company. 
3. Standing, enforcement and attorneys general 
'rhe relatively small amount of charter school litigation in 
"restrictive" states, including Pennsylvania and Ohio, may be 
related to limits with regard to who may bring suits. ln 
Pennsylvania, the school districts that refuse to grant a charter 
have standing to challenge the nonprofit charter school and its 
for-profit management company if the school subsequently 
wins the right to a charter on appeal. Other constituencies 
have sought to challenge EMOs by challenging thc nonprofits 
that hire them to manage their schools. 'rax-payers95 and 
neighboring school districts,96 who have argued that charter 
grants to nonprofit groups which have contracted with EMOs 
were improper or that their funds are being diverted to, 
essentially for-profit schools, have failed because courts have 
refused to grant standing. Courts have held that charter 
school statutes prohibit even the state department of education 
from bringing suit to enforce the obligations of charter school 
boards. 97 'rhis limits the enforcement power of the courts to 
actions brought by charter-granting school districts, which 
appear to be uniformly overrulcd by the Pennsylvania courts to 
date. 
94. The l'ennsylvania statute reads: 
Powcrs of hoard of trustec>s (a) The board of trustL•es of a charter school shall havc 
thc authority to decide mattcrs related to thc opcration of the schonl, including. 
but not limited to, hudge>ting, curriculum and opNating proccdures, subjcct to thc> 
school's charter. Tlw hoard shall havc the authority to cmploy, dischargt• anel 
contract with necessary professional and nonprofcssional crnploycs lsicl subjcct to 
thP school's charter and the provisions of this artick .... (c) Thc hoard of trustccs 
shall comply with thc act of .July :1, 1 !c! H() (P.L. :1HH, No. H4), known as tlw 
'Sunshinc> Act.' 
l'A. CONS. STAT. ÀNN. § 17-1716-A 
95. See, e.g., Fairficld Arca Sch. Dist. v. Nat'l Org. for Childrcn, lnc., 8:l7 i\.:2d 6·14 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 200:l); /Jrackbill, 777 A.2d 1:31:. W. Chester Arca Sch. /Jist., 760 A.2d 
452. 
96. Fairfield, s:n A2d at 644; !'a. Sch. Bds. Ass'n v. í':oghy, H02 A.2d 6 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 2002). 
97. Zoghy, 802 A2d 6. 
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Traditionally, enforcement of nonprofit law has been the 
purview of the state attorney general. 98 ln Ohio, however, the 
courts recently ruled that charter schools, which must be run 
as nonprofits as a matter of state law, are immune from 
attorney general oversightY9 While the suit did not include a 
for-profit management company, it did involve claims that the 
nonprofit charter school board was not meeting its obligations. 
The Ohio attorney general brought an action against the board 
based on a charitable trust theory, alleging that the board 
failed to meet "fiduciary duties with regard to the public 
moneys it has received." 100 According to the attorney general, 
the arrangement between the state, the charter school board, 
and the public was structured as a trust. "The [s]tate (settlor) 
provides funds to [the charter school] (the trustees) for the 
benefit of ... students and the general public (the 
beneficiary)." 101 The action sought to either terminate the trust 
or replace the board members. 102 
The court ruled that as a charter school, the organization 
was no longer merely a nonprofit, but a "politicai subdivision 
and a legislatively-created public school falling within the 
state's system of public education and the oversight of the 
Department of Education." 103 As such, it was not subject to the 
oversight of the state attorney general. Without attorney 
general oversight, the charter schools of Ohio are subject only 
to the control of their sponsoring district board of education 
(like Pennsylvania), and parents, who may vote with their feet 
by removing students from the school. 
Outside of nonprofit law, state contract law might provide 
nonprofit board members a framework for exerting control over 
overbearing EMOs. However, upon quick reflection, it is 
apparent this is unlikely. Where EMOs have created boards 
with members whose interests align with the EMOs, the 
nonprofit charter board is not likely to sue to enforce the terms 
9H. See .Jen•my Benjamin, Note, Reinvigorating Nonprofit Dircctors' Du.ty of 
Obedience, :lO CAIWOZO L. i{EV. 1677, 1697-98 (2009) (asserting that only state 
attorm,ys genmal have standing in cases involving a nonprofit dirl•ctor's fiduciary 
hreach). 
99. State ex rei. ]{ogers v. New Choices Cmty. Sch., No. 2:3031, 2009 WL 2857360, 
at *12 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 1, 2009). 
100. Id. at *:l-1. 
101. ld. at *1. 
102. ld. at *1-5. 
1 O:l. ld. at *9. 
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of the agreement where they upset an arrangement that serves 
the EMO. If, as in Ohio, the courts have found charter schools 
and their boards immune from attorney general investigation, 
there are no legal options to protect the charter school from 
becoming a mere alter ego of the EMO. 
B. Risks Facing Nonprofit Charter Schools Under the 
Internal Revenue Code 
ln addition to state law prohibitions, the relationship 
between a nonprofit charter school board and its for-profit 
management company has implications for the nonprofit's tax-
exempt status under federal law. 104 According to its manual, 
the IRS recognizes the complex and interdependent 
relationships that may exist in charter school formation. 105 
When considering the tax-exempt status of new or existing 
nonprofits that are working with for-profit compames, it 
cautions examiners that: 
Organizations . . . operating schools under a charter 
agreement, may have little or no experience in managing or 
establishing a school and often contract for a myriad of 
services including, among others, curriculum design, financial 
management, office management, and special education 
services. Comprehensive school management companies are a 
growing presence in the educational sector and offer a 
complete program of both management and educational 
services. For a charter school to establish exemption under 
IRC § 50l(c)(3), whether it contracts out some or all of the 
services required to operate, it must establish that it is 
organized and operated for exclusively charitable purposes 
and not for the benefit of private management companies 
and/or for service providers. 106 
The IRS is interested in whether the charter school board 
remains in control and continues to exercise its fiduciary 
responsibility to the school. 107 A board appointed or dominated 
101. ,JAM~;s ,J. F!SHMA:-l & ST!WHEN SCIIWARTZ, NONI'IUWIT O!U:ANIZATIONS CASES 
AND MATE){IALS 596 (:ld ed. 200fí). 
105. lRS MANUAL 1. 76.8.8-CHAWI'I•;R SCHOOLS (.July 1,200:3) WL (I{]J\-IHM). 
106. Il{S MANL'AL 1. 76.8.8.1 (:1)-CHAI{'I'I<:I{ SCHOOLS EXI·;MI'T STSI'lJS (,Ju]y 1. 200:3) 
WL (lUA-mM). 
107. TE!WY BERKOVSKY, ÂNilREW M~X:OSH, DimltA COWEN & DAVIIJ DAUME, 
CHAiiTim ScHooLs, EXJ<:MPT Oit<:ANIZA'I'IONS CON'I'INlJING l'IHWI•:ssioNAL EIJUCATlON 
(Cl'E) TECHNICAL INS'I'IWCTION l'H<J<:i{J\M FY 2000, 2000 WL :11102222 (l.R.S.). 
available at http://www.irs.gov/publirs-tegdeotopicjOO.pdf. 
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by a management company raises questions as to whether the 
school will be operated for the benefit of the management 
company. 10x The IRS will not grant tax-exempt status where a 
nonprofit charter school board has delegated its responsibility 
and ultimate accountability for the school's operations to a for-
profit management company. 109 
I. Charitable purpose, delegation and conflict of interest 
There are only four published IRS Service Advice Reviews 
("SARs") that discuss nonprofit charter school relationships 
with for-profit management companies, but the discussions are 
searching and indicate that the IRS has much higher 
standards for schools than the courts under state charter 
school legislation. 110 The IRS decisions also reveal more 
scrutiny of the history and players behind the creation of the 
nonprofit charter school, as well as the board's actual ability to 
operate in light of the contract with the management 
company. 111 Perhaps it is revealing that all four of the SARs 
deny tax-exempt status to the nonprofit schools because of 
their connections with management companies. 112 The 
decisions focus on three areas: (1) the management company's 
role in creation of the nonprofit and its board independence, (2) 
the terms of the agreement with the for-profit and the degree of 
delegation, and (3) the benefits flowing to the for-profit 
company. 
The earliest decision appears to be from 1997, denying tax-
exempt status to a kindergarten through sixth grade charter 
school with a "business and entrepreneurial" theme. 113 The 
IRS relied on the fact that the management company's 
principal incorporated the nonprofit charter school, established 
its board, made the application to the state for the grant of a 
charter, and established the scope of the curriculum. 114 
10H. ld. 
109. ld. 
110. 8ee, c.g, 2001 IRS NSAR 20010822R, 2001 WL :3181887::3 (Oct. 25, 2001); 
2001 ms NSAR 200107991{, 2001 WL 81818860 (Aug. :n, 2001); ll{S NSi\1{ 
2000075:m, 2000 WL :H518:l59 (Oct. :lO, 2000); 1997 Il{S NSAR O:l91, 1997 WL 
:l:l810217. 
111. ld. 
112. ld. 
11:l. 1997ll{SNSAI{O:l91, 1997WL:l:l810217. 
111. ld. 
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Members of the charter school's board included the 
management company principal. 115 
The IRS also detailed the terms of the management 
agreement, and deemed that the nonprofit had abdicated its 
oversight role by permitting the management company to 
oversee: curriculum development and the acquisition of 
instructional materiais, supplies and equipment; all 
extracurricular activities; hiring, firing and professional 
development of personnel; maintenance of the school facilities, 
including transportation and food; all school "business" 
opportunities and finances, and "any other function necessary 
or expedient for the administration of the school." 116 The IRS 
also appeared suspicious of the terms of renewal, which were 
automatic on an annual basis and did not require meeting any 
specific performance measures or other obligations of the 
nonprofit board. 117 Termination could only occur if the 
nonprofit board gave written notice in advance of the new 
school year. ln addition to the contract to manage the school, 
the management company and the charter school were further 
entangled in a lease agreement and promissory note that made 
the nonprofit a tenant of and debtor to the management 
company. 11 s 
The IRS concluded that the "business and entrepreneurial" 
charter school was created with a "dual purpose of operating an 
educational organization and providing business to" the 
management company. 119 It further held that even though the 
original board members (who were clearly interested parties 
with ties to the management company) had been replaced, the 
"new board" of the nonprofit had been appointed by the old 
board, and demonstrated no increased independence. 120 The 
IRS noted that the "new board" had taken no steps to review 
the management agreement, and appeared to be no more than 
a "rubberstamp of the status quo." 121 ln a final blow, the IRS 
stated that "even assuming. . . [the nonprofit board of 
directors] are independent, ... the management agreement 
115. !ri. 
116. ld. 
117. ld. 
llR. ld. 
119. ld. 
120. ld. 
121. ld. 
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gives [the for-profit] impermissible control of [the school's] 
operations. . . . [and] in effect, handed the keys [of its] 
operations to a for-profit management company, one which has 
been intimately tied to [it] since [its] formation." 122 
Perhaps the most insightful part of the IRS decision is the 
acknowledgement of the business model behind charter school 
management companies that drives its relationships with 
nonprofit boards. The IRS noted that in the case of the 
"business and entrepreneurial" charter school, the benefit 
clearly flowed to the for-profit, as the company was able to 
"create its own customer, eliminate competition, ... 
experiment and gain competence with [the] students, ... [and] 
improve its intellectual property" by setting up the nonprofit 
and negotiating the contract to run the school. 123 This was 
evidence that the benefits flowing to the for-profit were more 
than merely "incidental," 124 and prevented the nonprofit 
charter school from attaining tax-exempt status. 
The other cases are variations on the sarne themes. ln the 
decision to deny tax-exempt status to a charter school for the 
"deaf and hard of hearing," the IRS discussed the issue of 
conflict of interest and "arms-length" dealings, explicitly. 125 ln 
this case, the management company's principal (who 
apparently created a company that specialized in the education 
of the deaf) helped to incorporate the nonprofit charter school 
and sat on the nonprofit's board at the time it signed the 
management contract with his company. 126 Incredulous, the 
IRS noted that the lack of board policies on the issue, and the 
terms of the contract (which were "general" and "silent as to 
how the budget will be negotiated") reveal that there was no 
attempt to operate at "arms-length." 127 lndeed, the IRS was so 
troubled by the language of the contract, which made no 
mention of the charitable nature of the school to be managed, 
that it suggested the board had permitted the company "to 
maximize profit" at the expense of the school. 12R The IRS found 
122. ld. 
12:l. ld. 
121. ld. 
125. 2ooo ms NSi\1{ 2oooo7s:m. 2000 WL :l15S:l59 (Oct. ao. 2ooo). 
126. ld 
127. ld. 
128. ld. 
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that the nonprofit had become a captive, powerless party to a 
"one-sided" "adhesion contract" with its founder's company. 129 
ln two cases, a management company was contractually 
authorized not only to manage the school, but to renegotiate 
the school's charter with the charter-granting government 
organization or sponsor. 130 This reduced the nonprofit board's 
role to merely not terminating the annual agreement with the 
management company, as no other board activity appeared to 
be required. 131 Without notice from the board, the company 
would continue indefinitely to manage all finances, run school 
operations, and ensure a valid government charter by 
executing the renewal with the authorities, when required by 
statute, to keep public funds flowing. 132 
ln another decision, the IRS held tha t a nonprofit charter 
school, developed as an adjunct to a newly planned housing 
community, had "retained little, if any, ability to create an 
identity for [itselfj by allowing [the management company] to 
act as a buffer between [the school] and the people [it was] 
supposed to be serving: students, parents, teachers and the 
general public." 133 ln this case, the board had "contracted 
away" the obligations to create marketing plans and handle 
public relations for the school, create and manage parent-
teacher programs, as well as dictate student curriculum and 
instruction. 134 The sarne agreement included a non-compete 
clause, preventing any of the employees of the school (who 
worked for the company) from working for the nonprofit for one 
year. 135 This restricted the oversight of the nonprofit board 
enormously, with the termination of the agreement resulting in 
the need to completely reassemble the school's staff. 136 The 
IRS characterized the relationship between the nonprofit and 
the management company as being like a "franchise," where 
the nonprofit board was controlled by the management 
company, which dictated everything about how the school 
129. Id. 
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would function, and from whom the board would have to 
purchase all the related curriculum and materiais. 137 The 
contract made the company indispensible to the very existence 
of the school. 
2. Excess benefit transactions 
None of the IRS opinions impose tax liability because the 
Service does not grant tax-exempt status to any of the charter 
schools. However, one opinion discussed the threat of 
intermediate sanctions for excess benefit transactions in light 
of the arrangements between the school and its management 
company. 13R According to the decision, the "deaf and hard of 
hearing" school's officers, directors and management company 
would h ave likely faced tax liability under Section 4958, 139 
because of the management company's "substantial influence 
over" the school, its "manipulation of [the] contract 
negotiations" and the "excessive nature of the benefits flowing 
to" the company. 14° Considering the potential for excess 
benefit transactions in the charter school setting where there is 
board overlap between the school and its management 
company, it is regrettable that the IRS has not addressed the 
issue in its published guidelines for nonprofit charter 
schools. 141 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The number of charter schools continues to grow in many 
states. 142 For-profit education management companies will 
continue to serve this market. However, lessons learned by 
management companies over the last two decades reveal that 
operating charter schools is "more difficult and more expensive 
than [companies] anticipated." 143 This is, according to the 
companies, a result of "charter school opponents [who] have 
been able to impose high politica} and legal costs on these 
1 il7. ld. 
1:38. Jl{S NSAR 2000075:31{, 2000 WL il1518i)59. 
1:39. 2G U.S.C. § 1958 (2010). 
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organizations." 144 Economies of scale have driven industry 
consolidation, as companies like Mosaica, Chancellor Beacon 
Academies, Charter Schools USA, Edison Schools, and White 
Hat Management have displaced other, smaller management 
companies, and now operate multiple school sites, often in 
different parts of the country, from a centralized office. 145 This 
is not unlike a franchise business model. ln the face of 
shrinking profits and scrutiny from politicai leaders and the 
press, 146 management companies are becoming more selective 
about "client acquisition." 147 This does not bode well for 
nonprofit charter school boards. For-profit management 
companies will always seek ways to maximize control to ensure 
efficiency and profit. This includes driving the creation of a 
charter school from application to contract negotiation to 
subsequent charter renewal, where possible. Indeed, doing so, 
according to management company leaders themselves, 1s 
essential to success. 14R 
ln light of the negotiating power and motivations of 
management companies, the threat of nonprofit charter school 
board capture or inappropriate delegation comes into sharp 
focus. Because courts have shown themselves unwiJling to 
proscribe clear rules and appear to be generally overly 
permissive with regard to charter school boards, more guidance 
must flow from the legislative and executive branches. State 
charter schoollaw and IRS guidelines should be strengthened, 
clarified and harmonized to promote stronger board autonomy 
and accountability. The opportunity for abuse, in light of the 
limitations for oversight and enforcement from government 
and other parties, demands express directives for charter 
schools. The consequences of failure to govern can be 
catastrophic, including revocation of tax-exemption, imposition 
of tax liability, revocation of charter, and the loss of public 
trust, and therefore call for ex ante rules to guide board activity 
at every stage. 
The unintended consequences of increased rule making may 
be to chill the project of charter school creation, however it will 
strengthen the (arguably reduced number of) organizations 
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that are granted charters by making them less vulnerable to 
for-profit contrai, and resulting state or federal sanction. 
Critics of further rule-making argue that freeing charter 
schools from many of the regulations that constrain traditional 
public schools is a central precept of the movement that 
promotes innovation and experimentation. But, where 
management companies bring an existing "tested" and all-
inclusive "product" to charter schools (including facilities, staff 
and curriculum), it would seem that some increased regulation 
does little to undermine "innovation." 
Specifically, state charter school laws should, at a 
minimum, include the following directives: 
(1) Specify non-delegable duties for nonprofit boards, 
including fiscal management and maintenance of financial 
record-keeping that a contracting EMO may not conduct; 
(2) Require charter school boards to adopt conflict of 
interest I self-dealing policies for board membership that 
prevent board members who are employees or have any 
financial ties to a contracting EMO; 
(3) Require the nonprofit board (and prohibit the 
management company) to seek state charter renewal; 
( 4) Prohibit certain terms in agreements between charter 
school boards and management companies, including auto-
renewal without performance-based outcomes and board active 
review and decision-making; 
(5) Prohibit non-compete clauses for teachers and charter 
school staff when they are employees of the management 
company; 
(6) Prohibit or restrict ancillary agreements for loans and 
facilities that entangle charter school boards with management 
companies and diminish incentive and opportunity for active 
oversight; and, 
(7) Require boards to conduct a review and reveal any 
conflict of interest between board members and a contracting 
EMO before a charter is granted or renewed to avoid boards 
becoming management companies' alter egos. 
ln addition, the IRS should provide detailed guidance, 
perhaps in an updated Technical lnstruction Program, that 
summarizes its SARs to date and elaborates on less flagrant 
and extreme activities of nonprofits and management 
companies to help charter schools attain and retain their 
nonprofit status, as well as avoid tax liability for excess benefit 
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transactions. The Service should address the creation of "shell" 
nonprofits by management companies, as well as less egregious 
relationships. Charter schools need to understand how to 
structure relationships with a for-profit management company, 
and specifically which functions the IRS will require them to 
retain. Failing to do so leaves charter school boards in a 
perilous position, simultaneously under-prepared to negotiate 
with the management company, and the party who bears the 
risk for failure to comply with IRS obligations for tax-cxcmpt 
status. 
